Some comments on M. J. Crowe's review of evolution of mathematical concepts  by Wilder, R.L
HM6 Correspondence 57 
CORRESPONDENCE 
This department welcomes comments on the contents or policy 
of HM, corrections of errors in the literature, questions and 
discussion of previously published questions, brief notices of 
historical discoveries, and other communications of interest 
to the history of mathematics community. 
SOME COMMENTS ON M. J. CROWE'S REVIEEi OF 
EVOLUTION OF MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS 
R. L. Wilder 
University of California, 
Santa Barbara, CA 93106 
The February 1978 issue of Historia Mathematics Contains a 
thoughtful and provocative review [Crowe 19781 of the paperback 
edition of my book Evolution of Mathematical Concepts. In 
addition to agreeing that my "laws" are "worthy of study with a 
view to their justification or refutation" [Wilder 1974a, 1991, 
he raises some questions regarding the nature of the "forces" 
of evolution which I stated. These clearly call for the courtesy 
of a reply in order to clarify the meanings of some of the "laws." 
These "forces" are intended to mean forces operative in 
cultural evolution, and although I have restricted my own use of 
them to the evolution of mathematics, they are generally applic- 
able to the whole range of concepts of cultural evolution. Not 
all of them were originated by anthropologists, to be sure, 
although some are specifically discussed in the anthropological 
literature. Environmental stress, symbolization, diffusion, 
cultural lag, and resistance have all been studied by anthro- 
pologists; but hereditary stress and consolidation seem not to 
have been. So far as I know, the first mention of consolidation 
as a force occurred in my AAAS lecture [Wilder 19531, where I 
used the term "fusion" instead of "consolidation" [l]. In my 
book, however, I preferred the latter term. 
Regarding Professor Crowe's discussion of my ten "laws" 
[Wilder 1974a, 199-2031 there are several clarifications I should 
make: 
In his discussion of laws 1 and 2, Professor Crowe seizes 
upon the word "utility" in law 1 and interprets the combined 
laws 1 and 2 to mean "Utility dominates, and if it doesn't, 
it will some time." My first reaction to this interpretation is 
that it exaggerates my use of the term "utility." My use of this 
term in law 1 is unfortunate; I would prefer that the word 
"fruitfulness," which I used in law 2, besubstituted for "utility' 
in law 1, since I meant to include utility to pure mathematics, 
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whereas the word may connote only applied mathematics to some 
readers. Consider, for example, "aesthetic considerations." 
Certainly a concept may arise from the aesthetic desires of its 
creator(s); but its ultimate adoption by the mathematical community 
will depend on its contribution to the advancement of mathematics, 
not just on the fact that its creator(s) found it aesthetically sat 
isfying. Can the demand that a result be fruitful be satisfied if 
the result is only "aesthetically satisfying?" I am inclined to 
grant that it can be, if the mathematical community at large finds 
the result aesthetically satisfying. Incidentally, Professor Crowe 
has published [Crowe 19751 ten laws; his law 3 seems to be in 
agreement with my law 2. 
The assertion that "it seems that the discovery and long- 
time rejection of 'incommensurables' and imaginary magnitudes 
was not based on utility," is a case of rejection, not acceptance. 
I presume that a concept may be rejected for all kinds of 
reasons--in extreme cases simply because its creator is disliked 
by his fellow mathematicians; or in favor of a concept proposed 
by someone of higher status in the scientific community. The 
point, however, is that if a concept is fruitful for the advance 
of mathematical theory, it, or an equivalent alternative, or a 
generalization, will ultimately be adopted. 
The word "origin" can be tricky. Consider "imaginaries," 
for instance (Professor Crowe's example). According to Pro- 
fessor Struik [1948, 1141, they were first thrust upon the 
mathematical scene in the algorithmic solution of third-degree 
equations. Since "real" roots emanated from their use (in the 
de1 Ferro algorithm cited by Cardano), they were admitted as 
operational devices (although even Cardano called them "fictitious" 
This was despite the fact that they were then "conceptualized" 
as "square roots of negative numbers"--something inconceivable 
in the mathematics of the time. As their usefulness and 
permanence in mathematics became more apparent, the question of 
how they could be rationally conceived--creation of a concept-- 
was ultimately faced and solved. In the latter event really 
lies the origin of the concept of imaginaries as we now use them. 
Note that in my laws 1 and 2 I spoke of "concepts," not symbols; 
until m received satisfactory conceptualization, it was 
really only a ("fictitious") operational symbol. 
Regarding incommensurables, of whose "discovery" Professor 
Crowe asks, "does not this discovery, being destructive of 
usefulness, serve as a counter-example to laws 1 and 2?", let 
us consider briefly their history. The identity of the first one 
to note the incommensurability of certain pairs of geometric 
magnitudes is unknown. Some authors believe the Pythagoreans 
first found such pairs and tried to keep them secret since they 
would show the inadequacy of the Pythagorean system. Like the 
imaginaries, incommensurables were apparently thrust upon the 
mathematical scene by certain operations--in the case of the former 
HM6 Correspondence 59 
in the solving of equations; in the case of the latter, in the 
comparison (ratio) of geometric magnitudes. As in the case of 
the imaginaries, the incommensurables were ultimately concep- 
tualized in the form of the irrationals, precisely because of 
their fruitfulness in mathematics, especially in the theory of 
the continuum. 
I am not sure that I understand Professor Crowe’s comments 
on law 3. The use of the word “feasible” in the portion of 
law 3 which he cites is perhaps unfortunate; here again the 
words “fruitful” or “more efficient” would have been better. 
The problem of whether the consolidation is possible must 
be faced in every individual case, presumably. Thus, in 
recent history, the consolidation of algebra and topology, 
originally conceived as a means of solving problems previously 
inaccessible, presented a problem in itself (solved nearly 
simultaneously by Cech, Alexandroff, and others). Here again 
I may refer to Professor Crowe’s law 7 [Crowe 19751, in 
the discussion of which he refers to the Hamilton and Grassmann 
classics; here, to quote the second sentence of my law 3, “a 
more easily comprehensible form” evolved because of their 
importance in mathematics. 
My law 4 is not simply “a statement that multiple dis- 
coveries frequently occur,” but states, “If the advance of 
a mathematical theory will be promoted by the solution of a 
certain problem, the conceptual structure of the theory will 
evolve in a manner to permit the eventual solution of that 
problem [Z] . The circumstances are then likely to be such that 
the solution will be found.. .by several investigators working 
independently.. .‘I [Wilder 1974a, ZOO], 
Regarding law 5, certainly diffusion from one culture to 
another will not take place unless conditions in the latter 
provide a receptive climate; this is discussed more fully in 
[Wilder 1974a, 22-251. Professor Crowe’s statement “...diffusion 
of European mathematics to this continent went on for a few 
centuries before ‘new concepts’ began to evolve,” seems hardly 
a counter example to law 5, which was motivated by such examples 
as the effect which the widespread adoption of the decimal system, 
expanded communication between European cultures and, ultimately 
the New World, and proliferation of journals, had upon 
mathemat its . 
Professor Crowe’s feeling that my laws 6 and 10 “seem to 
be less historically based assessments of what has been the 
case, than optimistic extrapolations as to what, we all hope, 
will be the case,” surely should not include law 6; the explanation 
given in [Wilder 1974a, 2011 concerning World War II and 
establishment of the National Science Foundation, provide some 
historical background. Moreover, history shows many older 
examples, as for instance, the needs of the painters of the new 
schools of perspective in the Renaissance and their influence 
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in the creation of projective geometry, and the needs of the 18th 
century French military for designs of fortifications, in 
the provision of which Monge invented descriptive geometry. As 
for law 10, it is admittedly based on extrapolation from past 
history, particularly on such events as those cited in laws 8 
and 9 (see 201, paragraph 2)) but in my opinion still seems a 
reasonable forecast. Of course, such cases as the three-body 
problem and Fermat’s Last Problem, cited by Professor Crowe, 
may never be solved--or, conceivably, be proved unsolvable 
by the use of orthodox methods. Despite this, both analysis and 
number theory seem to progress continually. 
Citation of the Hellenistic culture as counter to the 
assertion of law 7 seems inappropriate, for the feverish 
activity in science and the arts following the establishment of 
the Museum and Library in Alexandria, bringing together scholars 
from all parts of the civilized world of the time, can hardly 
be called “static I’ It was this period which spawned the . 
works of Archimedes, Ptolemy, etc., not the later period in 
which the Hellenistic culture became involved in metaphysical 
disputes and which I would term “static.” One can refer to 
Chapters V through VII of M. Kline’s “Mathematics in Western 
Culture” for a description of these events. I might recall that 
in my Congress address [1950, 2651, I emphasized the following 
remark : “No branch of mathematics can pursue its course in 
isolation indefinitely, without ultimately reaching a static 
condition.” This statement can be considered as complementary 
to my law 7, which emphasizes the environment. 
In connection with my laws 8 and 9, I agree that the word 
“crisis” may be too strong and has been possibly overworked 
in the literature. I used it since it seemed the most popular 
term, among historical works concerning the Foundations of 
Mathematics during the first quarter of the present century, 
to describe the situation following the discovery of the antinomies, 
or, in ancient times, the discovery of incommensurability 
and the paradoxes of Zeno. These so-called “crises” certainly 
stimulated accelerated evolution of new concepts. So far as 
Intuitionism is concerned, I regard it (and more modern forms 
of constructivism) not with “hostility,” but as one of the forms 
which the mathematical culture invented to meet the “crises” 
engendered by the contradictions revealed by the unrestricted 
theory of the infinite. (Notice, by the way, that I used the 
words “can be regarded,” not that “I regard. ‘I) To regard 
Intuitionism as a kind of (unsuccessful) “cultural resistance” 
still seems to me consistent with the assertion that the other 
forms (Zermelo set theory, e.g.) of meeting the crisis ac- 
celerated evolution of new concepts. In this connection, I might 
mention that Professor Crowe’s Law 9 seems to complement my law 
8. 
Professor Crowe intimates that I am a “pragmatist” (1978, 
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1051 --I presume as a result of my having emphasized the effect 
of environmental and internal needs upon the evolution of 
mathematics. (I have also been characterized as a “conceptualist. 
I prefer to identify myself as a “cultural evolutionist,” since 
my main efforts insofar as the historiography of mathematics 
is concerned have been motivated by the fact that I consider 
mathematics a part of culture, and hence, subject to whatever 
forces may operate in the evolution of culture. 
In conclusion, let me emphasize my gratitude to Professor 
Crowe for his reactions to my ideas. I hope they may engender 
further discussion. 
NOTES 
1. In a paper [Dieudonng 19751 read before the recent American 
Academy workshop on the Evolution of Modern Mathematics, J. 
Dieudonne’ discussed the effect of what he called “fusion” in 
mathematics, As I interpret his presentation, he is thinking of 
“consolidation,” although he gives no indication of deeming 
it a force in a cultural setting (and is apparently unaware of 
my discussion of the term in [Wilder 19681, for instance). 
2. Professor Crowe’s citation of Fermat’s Last Problem and 
the three-body problem in connection with my laws 6 and 10 
might better have been used here. On the other hand, the 
recent solution of the four-color problem, after a century of 
futile attempts, stands as a warning that the former problems 
may at any moment be solved. Incidentally, in my Congress 
Lecture [Wilder 1950, 2651, I stated, “When a culture or cultural 
element has developed to the point where it is ready for an 
important innovation, the latter is likely to emerge in more 
than one spot .‘I 
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SOURCES 
This department welcomes correspondence, brief announce- 
ments, and article-length descriptions of collections of 
publications, correspondence, and archival material relevant 
to the history of mathematics. Manuscripts describing major 
collections (covering such matters as acquisitions, size, scope, 
state of cataloguing, current and future availablity, and so on) 
should follow the same standards as other articles. 
CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC ARCHIVES CENTRE 
OXFORD, ENGLAND 
The Contemporary Scientific Archives Centre, which began 
operations in April 1973, accepts collections of manuscripts 
and papers of individuals whose contributions to science are of 
interest to historians of science. The collections are processed 
and sent for permanent deposit to the libraries of various insti- 
tutions. In addition to those cited earlier in Historia 
Mathematics (1976, 3(4), 472), the current list of published 
catalogues includes the following collections. The place of 
deposit is given parenthetically: H.T. Pledge, History of 
Science (Sussex University Library); F.J.W. Whipple, Meteorology 
and Mathematics (Cambridge University Library); E.C. Titchmarsh, 
Mathematics (New College Archives, Oxford); D.R. Hartree, Mathema- 
tics (Christ's College Library, Cambridge); A.M. Turing, Computer 
Science (King's College, Cambridge); S. Gill, Computer Science 
(Science Museum Library, London); British Association Mathematical 
Tables Committee (Bodleian Library, Oxford). Among the collec- 
tions being processed now are those of C. Strachey (Computer 
Science), C.A. Coulson (Mathematics and Theoretical Chemistry), 
and G.I. Taylor. 
A visit by R.J. Overmann of the National Science Foundation, 
Washington, D.C., to the Centre is mentioned in the most recent 
progress report (No. 9). Dr. Overmann's visit was related to 
the question of establishing a similar centre in the United States. 
Anyone who is interested in obtaining further information 
about the Centre may write directly to: Professor Margaret 
Gowing, F.B.A., Director, Contemporary Scientific Archives 
Centre, 10 Keble Road, Oxford, OX1 2QG, England. 
